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UNITED STATES v. ROSS: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
TAKES A BACK SEAT TO THE AUTOMOBILE
EXCEPTION
I. INTRODUCTION
The warrantless search and seizure of an automobile and its
contents encompasses the balancing of two often confficting interests:
the individual's legitimate expectation of freedom from unreasonable
searches under the fourth amendment and society's desire to effectively
combat crime. For more than fifty years, the United States Supreme
Court has attempted to balance the interests of both the individual and
society in the area of warrantless automobile searches.' During this
period the Court has frequently struggled to delineate the constitu-
tional parameters of a warrantless intrusion upon a vehicle, its driver,
and its contents.z
In United States v. Ross,3 the United States Supreme Court4 ex-
tended the authority of law enforcement officers to search all the con-
tents of a lawfully stopped vehicle by eliminating the warrant
requirement where officers have probable cause to believe that the ve-
hicle contains contraband. By rejecting the notion that an individual
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in containers found in an auto-
mobile, the Court eliminated the protection previously provided
against warrantless container searches.5 The Court's concern for effi-
1. The United States Supreme Court initially confronted the legality of a warrantless
automobile search in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). For a more detailed
discussion of Carroll, see infra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
2. For other articles which analyze the Supreme Court's struggle with warantless auto-
mobile searches, see Katz, Automobile Searches and Diminished Expectations in the Warrant
Clause, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 557 (1982); Note, Robbins and Belton-Inconsistency and
Confusion Continue to Reign Supreme in the Area of Warrantless Vehicle Searches, 19 Hous.
L. REv. 527 (1982); Note, Robbins v. California and New York V. Belton: The Supreme Court
Opens Car Doors to Container Searches, 31 AM. U.L. REV. 291 (1982); Comment, Fourth
Amendment-Of Cars, Containers and Confusion, 72 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1171
(1981); Wilson, The Warrantless Automobile Search: Exception Without Just#Fcation, 32
HASTiNGS L.J. 127 (1980).
3. 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
4. Justice Stevens' majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Associate
Justices Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist and O'Connor. Justice Blackmun and Justice Powell
also filed concurring opinions. Justice Marshall filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice
Brennan joined, and Justice White filed a separate dissenting opinion.
5. The principle that an individual has a constitutionally protected expectation of pri-
vacy under the fourth amendment was first recognized in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[Aln enclosed telephone booth is an area where,
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cient law enforcement weighed heavily in its decision to broaden the
scope of a warrantless search.
This casenote examines the Ross opinion in light of the traditional
justifications for warrantless automobile searches and concludes that
the case does not logically extend those justifications. It also questions
whether the majority's reasoning supports its conclusion that the exist-
ence of probable cause to search an automobile justifies the search of
containers found in the automobile. Finally, this note discusses the
majority's unsatisfactory reconciliation of Ross with the holdings in
United States v. Chadwick7 and Arkansas v. Sanders,8 which under-
mined the Court's attempt to clarify the permissive scope of a warrant-
less automobile search.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On November 27, 1978, a reliable informant called the District of
Columbia Police Department to report that a man known as "Bandit"
was selling drugs kept in the trunk of his car parked at 439 Ridge
Street.9 Three policemen, including a Detective Cassidy, drove to 439
Ridge Street where they observed a car matching the description pro-
vided by the informant.' 0 A radio check revealed that the car was reg-
istered to Albert Ross, Jr., whose alias was "Bandit.""
The officers drove through the neighborhood twice, spotted Ross
driving his car, and stopped him.'2 After instructing Ross to get out of
the car, they conducted a search of the car's interior.' 3 Upon discovery
of a pistol and ammunition inside the car, Ross was arrested and hand-
cuffed.' 4 Detective Cassidy then took Ross's keys, opened the trunk,
and found a closed but unsealed brown paper bag.'" Cassidy immedi-
ately opened the paper bag and discovered a number of glassine bags
like a home. . . a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy
.... "). The Supreme Court subsequently recognized this protection as applying to con-
tainers found in a vehicle. See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981); Arkansas v.
Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
6. See infra notes 153-60 and accompanying text.
7. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
8. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
9. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 800 (1982).
10. Id
11. Id
12. United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en bane), rev'd, 456 U.S.
798 (1982).
13. Id
14. Id
15. 456 U.S. at 801.
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which contained heroin. 16
The car was subsequently removed to the police station. 17 In the
course of a more thorough search of the vehicle, Detective Cassidy
found a zippered leather pouch.' 8 Unzipping the pouch, he discovered
$3,200 in cash.'9 At no point during the entire investigation did the
police obtain a search warrant. °
A federal grand jury indicted Ross2' for possession of heroin with
intent to distribute.22 Ross moved to suppress the evidence obtained
from the paper bag and the leather pouch, but the district judge denied
Ross's motion and he was convicted following a jury trial.23
A three-judge panel of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia reversed the conviction, holding that the warrantless
search of the paper bag was valid but the search of the leather pouch
was not.24 The entire Court of Appeals then voted to rehear the case
sitting en banc and held that the police should not have opened either
the paper bag or the leather pouch without first obtaining a warrant.
The Supreme Court granted the Government's petition for certiorari
and reversed. 6
III. REASONING OF THE COURT
A. Justice Stevens' Opinion for the Majority
The majority initiated its discussion of Ross and the -scope of the
16. Id.
17. Id
18. Id
19. Id
20. Id
21. United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d at 1162.
22. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1976).
23. United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d at 1162.
24. 456 U.S. at 801-02. The Court of Appeals concluded that the police had probable
cause to stop and search Ross's car, and that based upon Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1925), and Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), the officers could conduct a
warrantless search of the car, including the trunk. However, on the basis of Arkansas v.
Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), the court invalidated the warrantless search of the leather
pouch because Ross possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in its contents. The court
upheld the warrantless search of the paper bag, however, due to the absence of a similar
expectation of privacy in its contents. 456 U.S. at 801-02.
25. 456 U.S. at 802. The court refused to recognize a difference between a paper bag
and a leather pouch, reasoning that such a distinction "would impose an unreasonable and
unmanageable burden on police and courts." 655 F.2d at 1161 (footnote omitted). More-
over, the court interpreted the fourth amendment as a protection for "all persons, not just
those with the resources or fastidiousness to place their effects in containers that deci-
sionmakers would rank in the luggage line." Id
26. 456 U.S. at 825.
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warrantless automobile search by emphasizing "the importance of
striving for clarification in this area of the law." 27 Justice Stevens
framed the issue as "the extent to which police officers-who have le-
gitimately stopped an automobile [without a warrant] and who have
probable cause to believe that contraband is concealed somewhere
within it-may conduct a probing search of compartments and con-
tainers within the vehicle whose contents are not in plain view."28 The
majority held that under such circumstances police may carry out a
search that is "as thorough as a magistrate could authorize in a warrant
'particularly describing the place to be searched.' "29
Justice Stevens first explained that the exception to the warrant
requirement established in Carroll v. United States3" "applies only to
searches of vehicles that are supported by probable cause."31 He con-
cluded that a search which falls within this exception "is not unreason-
able if based on facts that would justify the issuance of a warrant, even
though a warrant has not actually been obtained. 32
When probable cause exists for a search, the majority reasoned,
prohibiting the opening of containers discovered during the search
"could produce absurd results inconsistent with" the holdings of previ-
ous automobile search cases.33 The majority further supported its deci-
sion by pointing out that the practical considerations which justify an
immediate search, namely the difficulties involved in immobilizing a
vehicle while a warrant is obtained, "would be largely nullified if the
permissible scope of a warrantless search of an automobile did not in-
clude containers and packages found inside the vehicle."
34
27. Id. at 803.
28. Id at 800.
29. Id.
30. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
31. 456 U.S. at 809.
32. Id (footnote omitted). Applying this test to the facts of Carroll, Justice Stevens
concluded that the search in Carroll was constitutional because "[t]he scope of the search
was no greater than a magistrate could have authorized by issuing a warrant based on the
probable cause that justified the search." Id at 818.
The Ross majority relied heavily on Carroll to support its conclusion that the scope of a
warrantless automobile search should not vary depending upon the presence or absence of a
search warrant. Justice Stevens specifically held that "the scope of the warrantless search
authorized by [Carroll] is no broader and no narrower than a magistrate could legitimately
authorize by warrant." Id at 825. Justice Stevens reasoned that this was especially true
because Carroll "neither broadened nor limited the scope of a lawful search based on prob-
able cause." Id at 820.
33. Id at 818. The Court was specifically referring to the holdings in Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), and Chambers v. Maroney 399 U.S. 42 (1970). For a detailed
discussion of these cases, see infra notes 76-85 and accompanying text.
34. 456 U.S. at 820. Observing that contraband is almost always placed in a container,
[Vol. 16
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The majority also held that "[t]he practical considerations that jus-
tify a warrantless search. . . apply until the entire search of the auto-
mobile and its contents has been completed."35  Justice Stevens
reasoned that a contrary rule would require the police to search the
entire vehicle and then take containers to a magistrate for a warrant,
thereby "exacerbat[ing] the intrusion on privacy interests.
'36
The Court reasoned that "the privacy interests in a car's trunk or
glove compartment may be no less than those in a movable
container." 37 Therefore, since the trunk or glove compartment could
be searched without a warrant if probable cause existed, a container in
which an individual possesses a similar expectation of privacy should
be treated no differently. Thus, the majority concluded that "an indi-
vidual's expectation of privacy in a vehicle and its contents may not
survive if probable cause is given to believe that the vehicle is trans-
porting contraband.
'38
The majority attempted to strengthen this conclusion by compar-
ing the container search in Ross to a border search, a search incident to
arrest, and a search conducted pursuant to a warrant.39 Justice Stevens
suggested that since a person's reasonable expectation of privacy could
not prevent an immediate search in these three instances, that same
expectation of privacy should not prevent a warrantless search of an
automobile and its contents."n
The majority emphasized the need for police efficiency and expe-
diency: "When a legitimate search is under way, and when its purpose
and its limits have been precisely defined, nice distinctions between
...glove compartments, upholstered seats, trunks, and wrapped pack-
ages. . . must give way to the. . . prompt and efficient completion of
the task at hand.'
The majority found further support for its views in "the [legal]
profession's understanding of the scope" of the warrantless automobile
search.42 Citing to several decisions that upheld warrantless searches of
the majority argued that drawing a distinction between automobiles and containers served
only to frustrate the ability of police to search for contraband while providing offenders with
a means of avoiding detection. Id
35. Id at 821 n.28 (emphasis added).
36. Justice Stevens also concluded that "in every case in which a container was found,
the vehicle would need to be secured while a warrant was obtained." Id
37. Id. at 823.
38. Id (emphasis added).
39. Id
40. Id.
41. Id at 821 (footnote omitted).
42. Id at 819.
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containers found during lawful automobile searches,43 Justice Stevens
observed that the legality of these searches was apparently taken for
granted: "[I]t was not [even] contended that police officers needed a
warrant. . ... 44 The Ross majority noted that "[t]hese decisions...
'have much weight, as they show that this point neither occurred to the
bar or the bench.' "41 In fact, the Court explained, "prior to the deci-
sions in Chadwick and Sanders, courts routinely had held that contain-
ers and packages found during a legitimate warrantless search of an
automobile also could be searched without a warrant.
'46
In an attempt to limit the scope of its ruling, the Court emphasized
that a warrantless search is only authorized in those places where there
is probable cause to believe that the object of the search may be
found.47 The Court further stated that "[p]robable cause to believe that
a container placed in the trunk of a taxi contains contraband or evi-
dence does not justify a search of the entire cab."48 In Ross, however,
the police had probable cause to search the entire trunk, not just a par-
ticular container within it.49 Therefore, the Court reasoned, the search
was valid because police suspicion did not focus upon a particular
container, but rather upon the trunk in general.
Finally, the Court overruled its previous holding in Robbins v. Cal-
ifornia 50 as well as "the portion of the opinion in Arkansas v. Sanders
on which the plurality in Robbins relied."' 51 Although the Ross Court
rejected some of the reasoning in Sanders, it upheld its ruling in that
case.5
2
43. See Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931) (upholding warrantless search of
whiskey bags that could have contained other goods); Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251
(1938) (upholding search of 88 bottles of liquor, heavily wrapped in brown paper).
44. 456 U.S. at 819.
45. Id (quoting Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch 61, 88 (1809)).
46. 456 U.S. at 819 (footnote omitted).
47. Id at 823-25.
48. Id at 824.
49. "In the case before us, the car trunk, not any identified container in it, was suspected
of carrying contraband." United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d at 1167.
50. 453 U.S. 420 (1981) (plurality opinion). For a more detailed discussion of Robbins,
see infra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
51. 456 U.S. at 824.
52. Id In an earlier portion of the opinion, the majority emphasized that in Sanders
probable cause to believe that contraband was being transported in a container existed
before the container came into contact with the vehicle. Id at 812-14. In addition, the
police did not have "probable cause to search the vehicle or anything within it except" the
container. Id at 814.
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B. The Concurring Opinions
Justice Blackmun concurred in the majority's opinion because he
believed it went far to clarify a previously confused area of the law and
because it established standards that could be easily applied.53 Justice
Powell, in a separate concurring opinion, agreed.54 Moreover, Justice
Powell noted that the majority's attempt to establish an easily applied
and readily understood "bright line" rule was consistent with the simi-
lar approach taken in New York v. Belton. 
55
Unlike the majority, Justice Powell expressed his belief that "in
many situations one's reasonable expectation of privacy may be a deci-
sive factor in a search case."56 Despite this difference, his belief that
the Court should provide specific guidance to police and lower courts
led him to concur in the majority's opinion.
C. Justice Marshall's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, wrote a strong dis-
senting opinion 7 in which he accused the majority of "not only re-
peal[ing] all realistic limits on warrantless automobile searches, [but of]
repeal[ing] the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement itself."5 8 Un-
like the majority, Justice Marshall articulated the two primary ratio-
nales which justify a warrantless automobile search: the exigency
created by the mobility of the automobile 9 and the diminished expec-
tation of privacy associated with an automobile.6" He then explained
53. 456 U.S. at 825 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun stressed the impor-
tance, "not only for the Court as an institution, but also for law enforcement officials and
defendants, that the applicable legal rules be clearly established." Id
54. "[I]t is essential to have a Court opinion in automobile search cases that provides
'specific guidance to police and courts in this reoccurring situation.'" Id at 826 (Powell, J.,
concurring) (quoting Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 435 (1981) (Powell, J.,
concurring)).
55. 453 U.S. 454 (1981). See infra notes 111-15 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the Belton "bright line" rule.
56. 456 U.S. at 826 (Powell J., concurring).
57. 456 U.S. at 827 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice White also dissented, stating that
he would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and that
he would not overrule Robbins, Id at 826-27 (White, J., dissenting).
58. Id at 827 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall further claimed that "the ma-
jority opinion shows contempt for . . . Fourth Amendment values, ignores this Court's
precedents, is internally inconsistent and produces anomalous and unjust consequences."
Id
59. Id at 830 (Marshall, J., dissenting). For a more detailed discussion of the mobility
of the automobile as a rationale for dispensing with a warrant, see infra notes 79-91 and
accompanying text.
60. Id (Marshall, J., dissenting). For a more detailed discussion of the diminished ex-
19831
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that these two traditional justifications do not apply to a container,
"which can easily be seized and brought to the magistrate" and which,
unlike an automobile, "does not reflect diminished privacy interests."'6'
Justice Marshall criticized the majority's conclusion that practical
considerations support the extension of warrantless searches to contain-
ers.62 He reasoned that: (1) a package or personal luggage is easier to
seize than an automobile; (2) police might not have to "comb" the en-
tire vehicle to locate the container they seek; and (3) the immediate
opening of a container will not always protect the individual's
privacy.63
Justice Marshall also challenged the majority's reliance on the le-
gal profession's understanding of the scope of the warrantless automo-
bile search' and the majority's attempted reconciliation of Ross with
the holdings in Chadwick and Sanders. He concluded that the applica-
tion of Ross in light of Chadwick and Sanders would "create anoma-
lous and unwarranted results. '6
5
Justice Marshall asserted that "[t]he only convincing explanation
• . . for the majority's broad rule [was] expediency."" He rejected this
rationale, emphasizing that "'the mere fact that law enforcement may
be made more efficient can never by itself justify disregard of the
Fourth Amendment.' ,,
67
Relying on the holdings in Chadwick and Sanders, Justice Mar-
pectation of privacy as a rationale for a warrantless search, see infra notes 92-110 and ac-
companying text.
61. Id at 832 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
62. See supra text accompanying notes 34-36.
63. Id at 838 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall stated:
[Tihe burden to police departments of seizing a package or personal luggage sim-
ply does not compare to the burden of seizing and safeguarding automobiles....
The search will not always require a "combing" of the entire vehicle, since police
may be looking for a particular item and may discover it promptly. If, instead,
they are looking more generally for evidence of a crime, the immediate opening of
the container will not protect the defendant's privacy; whether or not it contains
contraband, the police will continue to search for new evidence.
Id (citations omitted).
64. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text. Justice Marshall suggested that this
reliance was "an unusual approach to constitutional interpretation," especially because "the
[legall profession formerly advanced different arguments against automobile searches than it
advances today." Id at 836 n.7 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
65. Id at 839 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall highlighted these potentially
inconsistent consequences by pointing out that a container found when the police had prob-
able cause to search the entire automobile would be treated differently than a container
discovered when the police had probable cause to search only that particular item.
66. Id at 841 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
67. Id at 842 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393
(1978)).
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shall concluded that "any movable container found within an automo-
bile deserves precisely the same degree of Fourth Amendment warrant
protection that it would deserve if found at a location outside the auto-
mobile."68 Applying this test to the facts in Ross, Justice Marshall con-
cluded that the paper bag and leather pouch could be seized but not
opened because "[n]o practical exigencies required the warrantless
searches on the street or at the station.
'69
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Background- The Development of the Automobile Exception
The fourth amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasona-
ble searches and seizures."7 In construing this language, the Supreme
Court has insisted that "[i]n the ordinary case. . . a search of private
property must be both reasonable and pursuant to a properly issued
search warrant."7 Even a search conducted under circumstances that
would justify the issuance of a warrant cannot bypass the warrant re-
quirement.72 The Court's demand that the existence of probable cause
justifying a warrant be determined by a "neutral and detached magis-
trate instead of. . . the officer engaged in the often competitive enter-
prise of ferreting out crime"" reflects its strong conviction that fourth
amendment rights are best protected by a separation of powers. The
Supreme Court further emphasized the magnitude of fourth amend-
ment rights when it stated that "searches conducted outside the judicial
68. Id at 834 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
69. Id at 835 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
70. The full text of the fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and partic-
ularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
71. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 758. See also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390
(1978); United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
The fourth amendment does not explicitly require the use of a warrant. The warrant
requirement is a judicial implementation designed to enforce the fourth amendment prohi-
bition against unreasonable searches and seizures.
72. See Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925) ("Belief, however well founded,
that an article sought is concealed in a dwelling house furnishes no justification for a search
of that place without a warrant. . . . [N]otwithstanding facts unquestionably showing prob-
able cause."); United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972) (prior
judicial approval required for governmental surveillance).
73. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
1983]
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process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable.
7 4
Nonetheless, a warrant is not required in every case. Exceptions to
the warrant requirement have been recognized "where the societal costs
of obtaining a warrant, such as danger to law officers or the risk of loss
or destruction of evidence, outweigh the reasons for prior recourse to a
neutral magistrate."75
One exception to the warrant requirement is the automobile ex-
ception, first identified in Carroll v. United States.76 A warrantless
search under this exception was originally justified by the exigency cre-
ated by the mobility of the automobile," and by the individual's di-
minished expectation of privacy in the vehicle.7"
1. The mobility of the automobile
In Carroll, the exigency created by the mobility of the automobile
prompted the Supreme Court to uphold the warrantless search of an
automobile's interior compartment where police had probable cause to
believe the vehicle was transporting contraband.7 9 The federal agents
who conducted the search for contraband in Carroll could not arrest
the defendants because the agents lacked a warrant and because the
defendants' crime was a misdemeanor not performed in the agents'
presence."0 The only choices, therefore, were to let the car and the oc-
cupants go, thereby losing the evidence, or to conduct a warrantless
search. In upholding the warrantless search, the Court stated that a
search of an automobile is permissible since "it is not practicable to
secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
74. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
75. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 759.
76. 267 U.S. 132 (1925). The Court has also recognized other exceptions to the warrant
requirement. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (voluntary consent);
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (plain view); Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752 (1969) (search incident to a lawful arrest); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stop
and frisk); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (hot pursuit).
77. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S.
42 (1970); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (plurality opinion).
78. See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433
(1973).
79. 267 U.S. at 162. In Carroll, federal prohibition agents stopped an Oldsmobile Road-
ster driven by two suspected bootleggers, Carroll and Kiro. Both had previously agreed to
sell illegal liquor to the agents who stopped the vehicle. While searching the car, the agents
tore open the seat cushion and discovered 68 bottles of gin and whiskey. Both agents be-
lieved the defendants were transporting liquor when they stopped the car. Id at 134-36.
80. Id at 156-58.
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locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought."8'
The Supreme Court significantly altered this rationale in Cham-
bers v. Maroney82 by permitting a warrantless search at the police sta-
tion, long after the automobile containing contraband had been
immobilized. 83 Justice White rejected the argument that only the im-
mobilization of the car should be allowed until a search warrant is ob-
tained.84  In essence, the Court permitted a search at the station
because a search would have been permissible on the highway. 5 The
Court's holding overlooked the fact that the mobility rationale which
originally permitted the search did not justify a search at the station
once the vehicle had been immobilized.
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire,86 a plurality of the Supreme Court
retreated from the Chambers reasoning, refusing to apply the mobility
doctrine to validate the warrantless search and seizure of an unoccu-
pied vehicle that had been seized by police in the suspect's driveway.
87
The plurality argued that it was not the mobility of the automobile
which justified an immediate search, but rather the exigency created by
its mobility.88 Thus, the Coolidge Court properly recognized that the
81. Id at 153. Chief Justice Taft, writing for the majority in Carroll, also recognized "a
difference. . . as to the necessity for a search warrant between goods. . . concealed in a
dwelling house.., and like goods in course of transportation and concealed in a movable
vessel." Id at 151. This distinction permitted future automobile cases to rely on the holding
in Carroll without affecting the constitutional limitations associated with the search of a
home.
82. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
83. Chambers involved the arrest of four suspects who were riding in a vehicle which
matched the description of a car previously used in the robbery of a service station. Police
officers seized the vehicle and drove it to the police station. At the station, the police con-
ducted a warrantless search, finding two .38-caliber revolvers and certain cards identifying
the service station attendant who had been robbed at gun point.
84. 399 U.S. at 52. "[W]e see no difference between . . . seizing and holding a car
before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and. . . carrying out an immedi-
ate search without a warrant."
85. "[Tlhere is little to choose in terms of practical consequences between an immediate
search [at the station] without a warrant and the car's immobilization until a warrant is
obtained." Id
86. 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (plurality opinion).
87. Id at 460-63. Police searched and vacuumed the vehicle two days after it was
seized, and attempted to introduce evidence discovered during the search. Id at 448.
88. The Coolidge plurality reasoned:
[Slurely there is nothing in this case to invoke the meaning and purpose of the rule
of Carroll v. United States-no alerted criminal bent on flight, no fleeting opportu-
nity on an open highway after a hazardous chase, no contraband or stolen goods or
weapons, no confederates waiting to move the evidence. . . In short, by no pos-
sible stretch of the legal imagination can this be made into a case where "it is not
practicable to secure a warrant," .. and the "automobile exception," despite its
label, is simply irrelevant.
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mobility doctrine identified in Carroll was intended to prevent the loss
of evidence occasioned by the failure to conduct an immediate search.
In Texas v. White,"9 however, the Supreme Court apparently
abandoned the notion that police officers must fear the loss or destruc-
tion of evidence before they may conduct a warrantless search. Rely-
ing on Chambers, the White Court upheld the warrantless search of a
vehicle which had been immobilized at the police station because the
police had probable cause to search the vehicle at the scene of the
crime.90 Thus, contrary to the holdings in Carroll and Coolidge, the
White Court apparently concluded that it is not the potential exigency
created by the mobility of the automobile which justifies a warrantless
search, but merely the mobility of the automobile itself.
Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly overruled Coo-
lidge, its continued vitality is doubtful in light of the White Court's
failure to require exigent circumstances before a warrantless search
may be conducted. The White decision therefore appears to affirm the
reasoning of Chambers.9 The fear of loss or destruction of evidence,
which originally justified the mobility doctrine, is no longer needed to
support a warrantless search.
2. The diminished expectation of privacy rationale
The second traditional rationale for dispensing with a warrant
under the automobile exception is the diminished expectation of pri-
vacy associated with a vehicle. This rationale stems from the Supreme
Court's pronouncement in Katz v. United States9 2 that "[w]hat a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not
a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. ' 93 The Court has applied
the rationale of Katz to automobiles, identifying three theories which
support a diminished expectation of privacy in a vehicle. These are:
(1) that vehicles are subject to extensive governmental regulation;94
(2) that their primary function is to transport passengers and not to
serve as a repository of personal effects;95 and (3) that the occupants of
403 U.S. at 462 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. at 153) (footnote omitted).
89. 423 U.S. 67 (1975) (per curiam).
90. Id
91. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
92. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
93. Id at 351.
94. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367-68 (1976).
95. See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974).
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a vehicle and some of its contents are subject to public view.96
In South Dakota v. Opperman , the Supreme Court noted that the
extensive governmental regulation of automobiles indicated a dimin-
ished expectation of privacy in vehicles generally.98 Therefore, Chief
Justice Burger upheld the warrantless search of an impounded automo-
bile because "the conduct of the police," in light of the diminished ex-
pectation of privacy associated with automobiles, "was not
'unreasonable' under the Fourth Amendment."9 9
In Cardwell v. Lewis,"°° the Court focused on both the transporta-
tional qualities of the car and the exposure of its occupants and con-
tents to public view. 1' Justice Blackmun concluded that these factors
demonstrated a diminished expectation of privacy sufficient to justify
the warrantless examination of the exterior of a car towed from a park-
ing lot to a police impound lot.'
0 2
The emergence of the diminished expectation of privacy rationale
expanded the scope of the automobile exception. The presumption of
an inherent diminished expectation of privacy in a vehicle permitted
warrantless searches which could not satisfy the mobility test of Car-
roll. The Supreme Court approved this interpretation in Cady v. Dom-
browski,10 3 noting that "warrantless searches of vehicles by state
officers have been sustained in cases in which the possibilities of the
vehicle's being removed or evidence in it destroyed were remote, if not
non-existent." 104
Although the Supreme Court was willing to allow the warrantless
search and seizure of an automobile based on the diminished expecta-
tion of privacy rationale, it has declined to apply a similar standard to
containers found in automobiles. In United States v. Chadwick, 0 5 the
96. Id For an application of the diminished expectation of privacy rationale to the facts
in Ross, see infra notes 123-28 and accompanying text.
97. 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
98. Id at 367-68. "[T]he expectation of privacy with respect to one's automobile is sig-
nificantly less than that relating to one's home .... Automobiles, unlike homes, are sub-
jected to pervasive and continuing governmental regulation .
99. Id at 376.
100. 417 U.S. 583 (1974).
101. "[A] motor vehicle['s] ... function is transportation and it seldom serves as one's
residence or as the repository of personal effects. A car has little capacity for escaping public
scrutiny. It travels public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in
plain view." Id at 590.
102. Id at 592.
103. 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
104. Id at 441-42. (citing Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968); Cooper v. Califor-
nia, 386 U.S. 58 (1967)).
105. 433 U.S. 1 (1976).
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Court invalidated the warrantless search of a footlocker seized from the
trunk of an automobile. 10 6 Chief Justice Burger explained that the di-minished expectation of privacy in an automobile, which justifies a
warrantless search, simply did not apply to the defendant's footlock-
er.tO7 The Court's holding established the principle that an individual's
reasonable expectation of privacy in a container could not be violated
by a warrantless search, absent compelling circumstances.
Arkansas v. Sanders °8 involved a similar factual situation. 10 9 The
Sanders Court refused to apply the automobile exception to containers
found within a lawfully stopped vehicle. The Court held that "the war-
rant requirement of the Fourth Amendment applies to personal lug-
gage taken from an automobile to the same degree it applies to such
luggage in other locations."110 As in Chadwick, the greater expectation
of privacy in luggage combined with the absence of any exigent cir-
cumstances persuaded the majority to conclude that the automobile ex-
ception could not be extended to this setting.
3. The Robbins-Belton dilemma
The difficulty in defining the precise scope of the automobile ex-
ception is to an extent the result of the incongruous holdings an-
nounced in New York v. Belton" and Robbins v. Calfornia."2  In
106. Police in Chadwick had probable cause to believe that a footlocker arriving by train
from San Diego contained marijuana. Police arrested the defendant after he claimed the
footlocker and placed it in the trunk of his car. Agents later searched the footlocker without
a warrant at the Federal Building in Boston. Id at 3-4.
107. The Chief Justice reasoned that "a person's expectations of privacy in personal lug-
gage are substantially greater than in an automobile." Id at 13.
The Chief Justice also rejected the Government's argument that the warrant clause of
the fourth amendment protects only those interests connected with the home. Id at 7.
Thus, by placing his belongings inside a double-locked footlocker, the defendant displayed a
significant desire to keep his possessions away from public scrutiny. The mere presence of
the defendant outside the confines of his home could not justify a warrantless search under
these particular circumstances.
108. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
109. In Sanders, police had probable cause to believe that the defendant, who was dis-
embarking from a plane, was transporting marijuana inside a green suitcase. Police fol-
lowed the suspect who placed the suitcase in the trunk of a taxi and drove away from the
airport. Several blocks from the airport the police stopped the taxi, opened the trunk and
then opened the suitcase without procuring a search warrant. Police discovered 9.3 pounds
of marijuana inside the suitcase. Id at 755.
110. Id at 766. The Sanders Court limited the scope of its holding by noting that "[niot
all containers and packages found by police during the course of a search will deserve the
full protection of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, some containers. . . by their very nature
cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy ... " Id at 764 n. 13.
111. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
112. 453 U.S. 420 (1981) (plurality opinion).
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Belton, the Supreme Court permitted the warrantless search of the zip-
pered pocket of a jacket found in the interior of a vehicle whose occu-
pants had already been removed and arrested.'1 3  Writing for a
majority of the Court, Justice Stewart ruled that the police may search
the passenger compartment of an automobile and any containers found
therein, if the search was incident to the lawful custodial arrest of
someone who occupied the automobile just prior to the arrest. I 4 The
creation of such a "bright line" rule was principally motivated by the
majority's desire "to establish the workable rule this category of cases
requires ."115
The search incident to arrest doctrine defined in Belton paved the
way for police to search any container found within the interior com-
partment of the vehicle. The scope of the Belton decision greatly ex-
panded the power of police to search because it is almost always easier
to establish probable cause for a custodial arrest than to establish prob-
able cause sufficient to satisfy a magistrate."
I6
The permissive scope of Belton was indeed surprising considering
the restrictive holding announced in RobbinsI I7 the same day. In Rob-
bins, a plurality refused to apply the automobile exception to a
container found within a vehicle, even though there was probable cause
to search the entire vehicle, and not just a particular container. I" The
plurality based its decision on two key assumptions: (1) the diminished
expectation of privacy that justifies a warrantless search of an automo-
bile does not extend to containers found within the car; and (2) for
purposes of the fourth amendment, no distinction between types of
containers should be made so as to provide varying degrees of
113. 453 U.S. at 462-63.
114. Id at 460. Justice Stewart reasoned that "[w]hen a person cannot know how a court
will apply a settled principle to a recurring factual situation, that person cannot know the
scope of his constitutional protection, nor can a policeman know the scope of his authority."
Id at 459-60.
115. Id at 460. The Be/ton Court's decision created a "bright line" rule because it per-
mitted the police to search any container found in the passenger compartment during a
lawful custodial arrest. Prior to Belton, the police were limited to a search of the "arrestee's
person and the area 'within his immediate control'-construing that phrase to mean the area
from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." Chimel
v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
116. 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT,
511-12 (1978). "Usually, it [is] far easier to show grounds to arrest the driver for some past
or present offense and then. . . justify the search as incident thereto than to show a present
probability as to the location of specific objects in the car . Id
117. 453 U.S. 420 (1981) (plurality opinion).
118. Robbins was the first case decided by the Supreme Court in which the police opened
a container found in the trunk, after having probable cause to search the entire vehicle.
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The inconsistency of the two decisions is graphically illustrated by
the often recurring situation in which probable cause to search the au-
tomobile is accompanied by the right to make a custodial arrest.
Under Belton, the search of a container found in the automobile would
be justified as incident to arrest, even in the absence of exigent circum-
stances, whereas Robbins would prevent the search of the identical
container.
The presence of a mere plurality in Robbins, a change in the con-
stituency of the Court, 20 the apparent inconsistencies between Belton
and Robbins, and the persistent confusion regarding the scope of a war-
rantless automobile search were all important factors in the Ross
Court's reconsideration and reversal of Robbins. An examination of
the traditional justifications for the automobile exception as applied to
Ross is an appropriate starting point for a critical evaluation of the
Ross majority's reasoning.
B. The Traditional Justfcations for the Automobile Excefption as
Applied to Ross
The majority did not analyze Ross according to the traditional jus-
tifications for the automobile exception. This failure may have demon-
strated its dissatisfaction with those rationales. In any event, the
traditional justifications do not support the use of the automobile ex-
ception in Ross.
First, the exigency created by the automobile's mobility, which
justified the search in Carroll,'2 ' simply cannot support the warrantless
search of the paper bag and leather pouch in Ross. Both containers
could easily have been seized and brought to a magistrate for the issu-
ance of a warrant before being searched. In addition, both containers
were under the exclusive control of the police and any arguably mobile
characteristics they might have possessed could not justify their imme-
diate search.'22 Moreover, Ross was already under arrest when the po-
lice searched the paper bag and leather pouch. Therefore, Ross's
119. 453 U.S. at 424-27.
120. Justice O'Connor replaced Justice Stewart, the author of the plurality opinion in
Robbins.
121. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
122. In Chadwick, the Supreme Court specifically rejected the Government's argument
that the mobility of containers in general could justify a warrantless search under the auto-
mobile exception. 433 U.S. at 13.
Vol. 16
UNITED STATES v. ROSS
mobility did not present the police with the problem of detaining him
while they were obtaining a search warrant.
Similarly, the three rationales which support a diminished expec-
tation of privacy in an automobile123 do not support the conclusion that
Ross had a diminished expectation of privacy in the items searched.
First, the contention that because "[a]utomobiles, unlike homes, are
subjected to pervasive and continuing governmental regulation"'24
their owners have a diminished expectation of privacy in them, does
not explain a diminished expectation of privacy in containers locked
inside an automobile trunk. The kind of governmental regulation asso-
ciated with vehicles generally involves "examin[ing] vehicles when li-
cense plates or inspection stickers have expired, or if other violations,
such as exhaust fumes or excessive noise, are noted, or if headlights or
other safety equipment are not in proper working order."' 125 These reg-
ulations, which authorize vehicle inspections to assure conformity with
established safety standards, do not generally authorize wholesale
searches of automobiles. Therefore, they do not demonstrate that there
is a lesser expectation of privacy associated with containers locked in-
side an automobile trunk.
The second rationale for a diminished expectation of privacy in an
automobile, that an automobile's primary function is to transport its
occupants, not to serve as a repository for their personal effects,
126
seems similarly inapplicable to Ross. Although a vehicle may be classi-
fied primarily as an instrument of transportation, the trunk arguably is
an exception to this general classification. Containers secured within a
trunk, as in Ross, may well be as closely associated with the vehicle's
function as a repository for personal effects as with its transportational
function.127
The third rationale, that a car "travels public thoroughfares where
both its occupants and its contents are in plain view"' 28 also does not
123. See supra text accompanying notes 94-96.
124. See supra note 98.
125. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 368.
126. See supra note 101.
127. Automobiles are vehicles of transportation which transport not only persons
but also belongings. Not uncommonly, they are used as temporary repositories of
personal effects: they store the suit or dress that one keeps forgetting to leave at the
cleaners, the bank statement that should be brought inside the house, the library
book that should be returned, the briefcase that will be needed at a subsequent
meeting, the work one had planned to do overnight, and various other personal
effects.
Grano, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 603,
637 (1982).
128. See supra note 101.
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apply to Ross. The reduced expectation of privacy associated with a
vehicle's occupants and those items which are in plain view does not
explain why an individual should have a lessened expectation of pri-
vacy in items deliberately concealed from view. Surely Ross exhibited
a greater expectation of privacy by placing the paper bag and leather
pouch inside the trunk than by exposing them to public view in the
interior of the car.
Although the Ross majority did not apply the traditional justifica-
tions for the automobile exception enunciated in Carroll and subse-
quent decisions, it did rely on Carroll to determine the boundaries of a
warrantless search.' 29 The Ross majority's interpretation of Carroll,30
however, overlooked one of the major reasons why the Carroll search
was constitutional: not only did the officers have sufficient probable
cause to satisfy a magistrate, but the mobility of the automobile also
created exigent circumstances. Ross did not involve exigent circum-
stances. The leather pouch and paper bag could easily have been
seized, and Ross, unlike the suspects in Carroll, was already under ar-
rest. Because only half the rationale for Carroll's exception to the war-
rant requirement was present in Ross, the majority's reliance on Carroll
was unwarranted.
The majority's conclusion that Carroll did not limit the scope of a
warrantless search13 ' suggests that the holding in Carroll did not con-
template well-defined limits on a warrantless search. This is not neces-
sarily true. As the Court explained in Chambers v. Maroney,
32
"[n]either Carroll. . .nor other cases in this Court require or suggest
that in every conceivable circumstance the search of an auto even with
probable cause may be made without the extra protection for privacy
that a warrant affords."'' 33 The Ross majority found in Carroll justifi-
cation for expanding the scope of warrantless automobile searches
without properly assessing the facts and reasoning of Carroll.
C Practicality--An Unpersuasive Argument
The Ross majority also based its decision on the belief that the
practical considerations which justify an immediate search would be
nullified if containers were treated differently than automobiles.
34
129. See supra note 32.
130. Id
131. Id
132. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
133. Id at 50.
134. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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This argument is persuasive only if the practicalities involved in seizing
a container are similar to those involved in seizing a vehicle.1
35
The majority, however, professed to find differences between the
two types of seizure, noting that "[a] temporary seizure of a package or
piece of luggage often may be accomplished without as significant an
intrusion upon the individual-and without as great a burden on the
police-as in the case of the seizure of an automobile." 36 The inconsis-
tency embodied in the recognition of a practical difference between the
seizure of a container and the seizure of an automobile undermines the
majority's argument that the practical consequences which justify a
warrantless search would be nullified if containers could not be opened
immediately.
The argument that the practical considerations that justify an im-
mediate search apply until the vehicle and all its contents have been
searched 137 is similarly unpersuasive. First, the police may be looking
for a particular item which could be discovered quickly without the
opening of containers. In this case, no practical considerations dictate
a further search through the vehicle's contents. Likewise, if the police
are merely conducting a general search for evidence, they may continue
to intrude upon the suspect's privacy interests by searching the entire
vehicle, even after searching all containers. Thirdly, allowing an im-
mediate search for fear of "exacerbat[ing] the intrusion"' 138 upon the
individual's privacy interests deprives that individual of the opportu-
nity to determine which action he considers more or less intrusive.
139
135. The practical problems involved in seizing a vehicle while police officers obtain a
warrant support an immediate search. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. at 153 (imme-
diate search permissible where not practical to obtain warrant).
Judge Wilkey, a dissenter in the Ross decision at the court of appeals level, argued that
there is little practical difference between obtaining a warrant to search a car and obtaining a
warrant to search a container.
When a warrant is required before a container is opened, the investigating officer
must stop the car, search it for containers capable of concealing contraband, seize
the containers and arrest the driver, secure the car, transport the driver to a secure
location, and then obtain a warrant. When a warrant is required before an auto is
searched . . . nothing is changed except that the officer also is required to secure
the evidence that might be within the car against the possibility of tampering. ...
United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en banc) (Wilkey, J., dissent-
ing), rev'd, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
136. 456 U.S. at 812 n.16.
137. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
138. 456 U.S. at 821 n.28. See supra text accompanying note 36.
139. If the Court were truly concerned with the intrusion upon the suspect, it would per-
mit the person best able to evaluate the infringement on privacy to decide whether he or she
would prefer an immediate search or a search at the station pursuant to a warrant.
Judge Wilkey asserted that permitting a suspect to choose between an immediate search
or a temporary detention and a search at the station is a "cruel choice" which creates an
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More importantly, such reasoning undermines the basic principle that
fourth amendment rights are best protected through prior review by a
detached and neutral magistrate. 40  Finally, Justice Stevens' conclu-
sion that a search of a container will always necessitate an impound-
ment of the vehicle14' overlooks the possibility that the suspect will
consent to the search in order to avoid the inconvenience of a tempo-
rary detention.
12 Elimination of the IndividuaPs Reasonable
Expectation of Privacy in Containers
The Ross decision effectively eliminated the individual's reason-
able expectation of privacy in containers found during the course of a
lawful vehicle search. This expectation of privacy had previously
shielded containers from warrantless searches in Chadwick, Sanders,
and Robbins.142  The reasoning by which the majority rejected this
fourth amendment protection is unpersuasive.
Justice Stevens' argument that containers should be subject to war-
rantless searches because trunks and glove compartments are subject to
such searches 143 is appealing; it appears inconsistent to permit an of-
atmosphere conducive to obtaining a forced consent from the suspect. 655 F.2d at 1198-99
(Wilkey, ., dissenting). Despite this possibility, a suspect's privacy interests receive greater
protection if he is given a choice, rather than if the choice is made for him.
140. "[Ihe whole point of the [warrant requirement]. . . is that prosecutors and police-
men simply cannot be asked to maintain the requisite neutrality with regard to their own
investigations--the 'competitive enterprise' that must rightly engage their single-minded at-
tention." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 450 (citation and explanatory footnote
omitted).
It has also been observed that:
The warrant process. . . "interposes an orderly procedure" involving "judicial im-
partiality" whereby a "neutral and detached magistrate" can make "informed and
deliberate determinations" on the issue of probable cause. . . . [A] significant part
of the protection which flows from the warrant process stems from the fact that the
critical probable cause decision is being made by a person possessing certain attrib-
utes and acting in a certain way.
2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEizURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 29 (1978)
(footnotes omitted).
The individual realizes additional benefits through the warrant process because:
Once a lawful search has begun, it is . . . far more likely that it will not exceed
proper bounds when it is done pursuant to a judicial authorization. . . . Further,
a warrant assures the individual whose property is searched or seized of the lawful
authority of the executing officer, his need to search, and the limits of his power to
search.
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977) (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523, 532 (1967)).
141. See supra note 36.
142. See supra notes 105-10 & 118-19 and accompanying text.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 37-38.
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ficer to break open a locked glove compartment or tear open the uphol-
stery, as in Carroll, yet deny him the right to open a package. The
Supreme Court, however, has previously emphasized that a vehicle ex-
hibits a diminished expectation of privacy whereas a container does
not."' In addition, the exigency created by the automobile's mobility
justified the extensive search of the upholstery in Carroll, regardless of
Carroll's expectation that the upholstery would not be torn open. Be-
cause no exigency complicated the Ross facts, Ross's legitimate expec-
tation of privacy in his containers should have been respected.
The majority's analogy to border searches, searches incident to ar-
rest, and searches pursuant to a warrant'45 likewise fails to support its
conclusion that the individual's expectation of privacy in containers
cannot survive as long as there is probable cause to believe the vehicle
contains contraband. These three types of searches are justified by con-
siderations not present in the Ross container searches.
A border search enables officials to search containers without a
warrant and even without probable cause. 46 These searches are per-
mitted because they realistically are the only way in which the Govern-
ment can prevent the flow of contraband into the country.147 As the
Court remarked in Carroll, "[t]ravelers may be so stopped in crossing
an international boundary because of national self protection reason-
ably requiring one entering the country to identify himself as entitled
to come in, and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully
144. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977) ("a person's expectations of
privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile"); Arkansas v.
Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 765 (1979) ("IT]he reasons for not requiring a warrant for the search
of an automobile do not apply to searches of personal luggage taken by police from
automobiles").
145. See supra text accompanying notes 39-40.
146. Border searches, then, from before the adoption of the Fourth Amendment,
have been considered to be "reasonable" by the single fact that the person or item
in question had entered into our country from outside. There has never been any
additional requirement that the reasonableness of a border search depended on the
existence of probable cause. This longstanding recognition that searches at our
borders without probable cause and without a warrant are nonetheless "reason-
able" has a history as old as the Fourth Amendment itself.
United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977) (footnote omitted) (upholding warrantless
search without probable cause of incoming international mail).
147. The purpose of [border] inspections--to identify citizenship, collect payment on
dutiable goods, and prevent the importation of contraband-would be almost com-
pletely frustrated by the confines of a search warrant predicated on a showing of
probable cause. Every year a large volume of people and goods must be easily and
rapidly processed through customs and immigration stations at numerous points of
entry. . . . In the absence, therefore, of a broad power of search at the border,
officials would commonly have to rely on the cooperation of those they question.
Ittig, The Rites of Passage: Border Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 40 TENN. L. REv.
329, 331 (1973).
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brought in.' Thus, national self interest and the possibility of per-
manently losing control over contraband permit an immediate warrant-
less search regardless of the individual's expectation of privacy.
A search incident to arrest also entails valid policy reasons that
justify the immediate warrantless search of containers. These justifica-
tions include protecting police officers from concealed weapons that are
readily accessible to the suspect and preventing the destruction of evi-
dence by the accused.'49
A search pursuant to a warrant also justifiably overcomes an indi-
vidual's desire to prevent the opening of a container. By obtaining a
warrant from a neutral and detached magistrate, police officers con-
form to the societal mechanism which seeks to protect the individual
from unreasonable searches under the fourth amendment. 150
That an individual's expectation of privacy does not prevent a
search in these three situations, however, does not support the argu-
ment that a person's expectation of privacy must yield to container
searches like those upheld in Ross. In Ross, there were no exigent cir-
cumstances, 15 national self-protection was not at issue, and the possi-
bility of the destruction of evidence was remote because Ross was
under arrest and handcuffed when the police officers searched the pa-
per bag and leather pouch.'
52
E. The New Just'cation for the Automobile Exception: Expediency
The majority's refusal to apply the traditional justifications for the
automobile exception and the failure of these justifications, when ap-
plied, to support the warrantless search of containers found in the vehi-
cle, suggest that the real rationale underlying the Ross opinion was
expediency. This rationale emerges at several points in the majority
opinion, most notably the majority's explanation for its refusal to draw
a distinction between the expectation of privacy in packages and in in-
148. 267 U.S. at 154.
149. [A] lawful custodial arrest creates a situation which justifies the contemporane-
ous search without a warrant of the person arrested and of the immediately sur-
rounding area. Such searches have long been considered valid because of the need
"to remove any weapons that [the arrestee] might seek to use in order to resist
arrest or effect his escape" and the need to prevent the concealment or destruction
of evidence.
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457 (1981) (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752,
763 (1969).
150. See supra notes 70-73 & 140 and accompanying text.
151. See supra text accompanying note 122.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 14-19.
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terior compartments' 53 and its emphasis on the practical considerations
that justify a warrantless search.'
54
The Ross decision will promote expediency. A police officer who
is prevented from conducting a warrantless search of containers found
in the course of a probable cause search "would be required to take the
object to a magistrate, fill out the appropriate forms, await the decision,
and finally'obtain the warrant. . . This process may take hours, re-
moving the officer from his normal police duties."' 5  Ross enables po-
lice officers to conduct an immediate container search without
appearing before a magistrate if they have probable cause to believe
that contraband is concealed in the vehicle.' 56 Additionally, permitting
warrantless searches should save the time involved in arresting a sus-
pect and impounding his vehicle if the search proved fruitless.'
57
Undoubtedly, expediency and efficiency are legitimate concerns.
"Expenditure of [police] time and effort [is] drawn from the public's
limited resources for detecting or preventing crimes. . . ."Iss To the
extent the Ross holding permits the police to make more effective use
of their time, it is commendable. However, increased police effective-
ness and expediency have been achieved in a costly fashion: the Ross
decision substantially limits fourth amendment protection by eliminat-
ing the separation of powers between officer and magistrate. 5 9 In ad-
dition, the Ross expediency rationale is inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's cautionary declaration that "the mere fact that law enforce-
ment may be made more efficient can never by itself justify disregard of
the Fourth Amendment."'
160
The Ross holding may be viewed in part as a response to criticism
153. See supra text accompanying note 41.
154. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
155. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. at 433 (Powell, J., concurring).
156. 456 U.S. at 823-25.
157. If a police officer has probable cause to believe that a vehicle is transporting contra-
band, it is improbable that he would permit the car and its occupants to depart without
examining containers found in the vehicle. Thus, if a police officer were unable to conduct a
warrantless search of containers, he would be forced to arrest the occupants, seize the vehicle
and its contents, and procure a search warrant. Ross, however, permits a police officer to
conduct a warrantless search of containers. If the officer is satisified after searching a
container that it contains no contraband, he is much more likely to release the car and its
occupants, thereby saving the time involved in arresting the occupants and seizing the
vehicle.
158. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. at 433 (Powell, J., concurring).
159. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
160. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978); see also Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971) (warrant requirement not an "inconvenience to be somehow
'weighed' against the claims of police efficiency.").
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that search and seizure law has become too complex for law enforce-
ment officers to understand and apply. 61  The majority attempted to
end this confusion by announcing a "bright line" rule: police officers
may search any container in which contraband may be secreted, as
long as they have probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contra-
band and they do not know exactly which container conceals the
contraband.
162
The Ross majority's implementation of a mechanical rule is simi-
lar to the Belton Court's adoption of a "bright line" rule covering
searches incident to arrest. 63 The trend established in these two cases
reflects a belief that the security protected under the fourth amendment
"can only be realized if the police are acting under a set of rules which,
in most instances, makes it possible to reach a correct determination
beforehand as to whether an invasion of privacy is justified in the inter-
est of law enforcement."'"
There are, however, negative aspects of the Ross Court's "bright
line" rule. Important fourth amendment protections are stripped away
by the blanket assumption that no container found during the lawful
search of a vehicle is entitled to the protection afforded by the warrant
process. 165 In addition, Chief Justice Burger has suggested that com-
plex fourth amendment issues are not properly addressed through the
adoption of "bright line" rules because "[w]e are construing the Consti-
tution, not writing a statute or a manual for law enforcement
officers."'
166
The Ross majority could have fashioned a "bright line" rule with-
161. The concurring opinions of Justice Blackmun and Justice Powell indicate that this
concern was a primary factor in their willingness to join the majority's opinion. 456 U.S. at
825-26 (Blackmun, J., & Powell, J., concurring); see supra notes 53-56 and accompanying
text.
162. 456 U.S. at 826. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29 & 47.
163. See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
164. LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures" The
Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SuP. CT. REv. 127, 142 (1974).
The failure to standardize rules in response to "every relevant shading of every relevant
variation of every relevant complexity" results in "a fourth amendment with all the charac-
ter and consistency of a Rorschach blot." Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amend-
ment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 375 (1974). The errors which police officers make when
applying rules that are not clear-cut "will mean that many convictions will be overturned,
highly relevant evidence. . . will be excluded, and guilty persons will be set free in return
for little apparent gain in precise and clearly understood constitutional analysis." Arkansas
v. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 772 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
165. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
166. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 768 (Burger, C.J., concurring). By joining the ma-
jority in Ross, however, Chief Justice Burger possibly signaled a retreat from his earlier
position taken in Sanders.
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out weakening fourth amendment protection. If instead the majority
had prohibited the warrantless opening of any container in the absence
of exigent circumstances, it would have provided the police with a
workable rule while maintaining the vitality of the warrant
requirement.
F The Ross Court's Reconciliation of Its Holding
with Chadwick and Sanders
The majority's attempt to clarify search and seizure law through
the creation of a "bright line" rule was undermined by its unsatisfac-
tory effort to reconcile its holding with those in Chadwick and Sand-
ers.167 This reconciliation was necessary because the Ross decision
upheld the warrantless search of a container found in an automobile
whereas in Chadwick and Sanders the Court invalidated container
searches conducted under similar conditions.
The Ross Court did not overrule the holdings in Chadwick and
Sanders.168 Under certain circumstances, Chadwick and Sanders will
still prevent the warrantless search of a container found in an automo-
bile. It appears, however, that warrantless searches will be prohibited
only to the extent that they fall within the scope of the two justifications
which supported the majority's attempted reconciliation of Ross with
the two earlier cases. These two justifications are: (1) the absence in
Chadwick and Sanders of probable cause to search more than a partic-
ular container; and (2) the presence in those cases of probable cause to
search the containers before they were placed in the vehicles. 169 Be-
cause the arresting officers in Ross had probable cause to search the
167. 456 U.S. at 824; see supra note 52 and accompanying text.
168. Id.
169. The majority did not directly address these rationales when it upheld Sanders; how-
ever, its discussion of Chadwick and Sanders in an earlier part of the opinion suggests that
these were the reasons why the warrantless searches in those cases were not permitted. Jus-
tice Stevens stated:
The Arkansas Supreme Court ruled that the warrantless search of the suitcase
[in Sanders] was impermissible under the Fourth Amendment, and this Court af-
firmed. As in Chadwick, the mere fact that the suitcase had been placed in the
trunk of the vehicle did not render the automobile exception of Carroll applicable;
the police had probable cause to seize the suitcase before it was placed in the trunk
of the cab and did not have probable cause to search the taxi itself. . . . As THE
CHIEF JUSTICE noted in his opinion concurring in [Sanders]:
'Because the police officers had probable cause to believe that respondent's
green suitcase contained marihuana before it was placed in the trunk of the
taxicab, their duty to obtain a search warrant before opening it is clear under
United States v. Chadwick . . ..
Here, as in Chadwick, it was the luggage being transported.. . not the auto-
mobile. . . that was the suspected locus of the contraband.'
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entire trunk and because probable cause to search did not exist before
the containers were placed in the car, the majority was satisfied that it
could uphold the warrantless search in Ross without disturbing the
holdings in Chadwick and Sanders.
Justice Stevens' reconciliation of Ross with Sanders on the ground
that there was probable cause to search the entire vehicle in Ross, but
only the suitcase in Sanders, creates inconsistencies that are difficult to
rationalize. As Justice Marshall observed, "why is [a container like the
one in Sanders] more private, less difficult for police to seize and store,
or in any other relevant respect more properly subject to the warrant
requirement, than a container that police discover in a probable-cause
search of an entire automobile?"' 7 °
This differentiation also places the Government in an awkward
position. To validate a search, the Government must prove that "the
investigating officer knew enough but not too much, that he had suffi-
cient knowledge to establish probable cause but insufficient knowledge
to know exactly where the contraband was located."'17' This dual stan-
dard actually penalizes the officer for conducting a thorough investiga-
tion by limiting his ability to search once his information becomes
sufficiently specific.' 7 2 This standard might also encourage the officer to
fabricate the information relied upon in order to avoid the necessity of
obtaining a warrant when probable cause to search is limited to a par-
ticular container.
Reconciling Ross and Sanders on the basis that the police in Sand-
ers had probable cause to search and seize the suitcase before it was
placed in the vehicle, whereas the officers in Ross did not have prob-
able cause to search the specific containers before the vehicle was
stopped, also creates inconsistencies. First, the identical container re-
ceives completely different protection under marginally variant circum-
stances. Secondly, it presents the courts with the potentially difficult
task of determining the point at which the investigating officers learned
of the container's contents." 3 Finally, police officers might be willing
Id at 812-13 (quoting Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 766-67) (footnotes omitted) (empha-
sis added).
170. 456 U.S. at 839-40 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
171. United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d at 1201 (Wilkey, J., dissenting), rev'd, 456 U.S. 798
(1982).
172. In Ross, for example, if further investigation revealed that the contraband was lo-
cated in a paper bag while the money received from narcotics sales was located in a red
leather pouch, the police would have had probable cause to search only those two contain-
ers. With probable cause thus limited to specific containers, Sanders would have prohibited
their immediate opening.
173. Justice Powell, concurring in Robbins, noted this possibility when he stated that
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to manipulate the information relied upon in order to avoid the perils
of a warrantless search like those conducted in Sanders and Chadwick.
Thus, in attempting to reconcile Ross with Sanders and Chadwick,
the majority hampered its stated purpose of clarifying search and
seizure law. Instead of eliminating confusion, the majority's attempted
reconciliation penalizes police officers if their investigation is too thor-
ough, encourages them to manipulate the information they relied upon,
and causes identical containers to be treated differently under margin-
ally different circumstances.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Ross Court's decision to overrule Robbins by permitting the
warrantless search of containers is hardly surprising given the Court's
decision to reconsider Robbins and not Belton ." The Belton "bright
line" rule, which permits the warrantless search of any container in the
car's interior, simply was at odds with the protection provided the same
container under Robbins. The Ross decision resolved the Robbins-Bel-
ton dilemma17 by implementing a rule for container searches under
the automobile exception which gives the police approximately the
same power to search as Belton provides for searches incident to arrest.
Although the holding in Ross comports neatly with the decision in Bel-
ton, Ross undermined the vitality of the warrant requirement and basic
fourth amendment protections by straying from the general principle
that exceptions to the warrant requirement should be jealously
guarded.
Most importantly, Ross signals the Court's perceived need to
maintain the automobile exception and the power it bestows upon law
enforcement despite the absence of the justifications which originally
supported it. The automobile exception to the warrant clause has be-
come an exception which no longer requires justification.
Perhaps Justice Powell, concurring in Robbins, envisioned the true
virtue of Ross when he observed that "expanding the scope of the auto-
mobile exception is attractive not so much for its logical virtue, but
because it may provide. . . an approach that would give more specific
guidance to police and courts .... ,, 176 It is unfortunate that rights as
"courts may find themselves deciding when probable cause ripened.. Robbins v. Cali-
fornia, 453 U.S. at 435 (Powell, J., concurring).
174. See supra notes 111-20 and accompanying text.
175. Id
176. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. at 435 (Powell, J., concurring).
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significant as those protected under the fourth amendment must suc-
cumb to expediency and anticipated clarity in the courts.
William Shinderman
